Topic
19 entries.
“We're going to be sending letters out in about a week and a half, two weeks, to countries, telling them what the deal is.”
The letters did not go out on that schedule. The first batch of tariff letters to trading partners was sent in early July 2025, roughly two weeks past the outer edge of the window, and the rates in them were repeatedly revised afterwards.
“I'll announce it over the next two weeks.”
No pharmaceutical tariff rate was announced within the two weeks. Trump kept promising pharma tariffs through the summer of 2025 before announcing a 100% tariff on branded imported drugs in late September 2025, nearly five months after the deadline he set.
“In the next two weeks or three weeks, I'm gonna be setting the deal.”
A 90-day tariff truce with China was announced after Geneva talks on May 12, 2025, but the comprehensive 'deal' Trump described did not materialise on that timetable; talks and truce extensions continued through 2025. Trade adviser Peter Navarro's companion boast of '90 deals in 90 days' also fell far short.
“Over the next two, three weeks. We'll be setting the number.”
The promised schedule of country-by-country tariff numbers did not arrive on that timetable. Trump returned to the same formula on June 12, 2025, saying letters setting unilateral rates would go out 'in about a week and a half, two weeks.' Letters began going out in July 2025, months after the original deadline.
“We're going to run 90 deals in 90 days.”
At day 76 there were two framework deals, with the UK and China, neither a full trade agreement. When the 90 days expired in early July 2025 the tally was still two, about 2% of the promise, and Trump extended the negotiating deadline into August. The Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs in February 2026 and by September 2026 the administration had paid out roughly $100 billion in tariff refunds.
“Instead of taxing our citizens to enrich other countries, we will tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich our citizens.”
Importers and consumers, not foreign governments, paid. The Yale Budget Lab estimated the tariffs cost the average U.S. household about $1,700 a year; inflation rose after the April 2025 announcement and consumer confidence fell for five straight months. On Feb. 20, 2026 the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, voiding the centerpiece of the program and forcing an estimated $175–$200 billion in refunds to the importers who had in fact paid.
“[paraphrase] On day one, I will sign the tariffs — 25 percent on Mexico and Canada, immediately.”
No tariffs were signed on Jan. 20, 2025; Al Jazeera and NBC News both flagged it as a missed day-one item. Mexico and Canada tariffs came weeks later and were repeatedly paused, and the broader program was voided by the Supreme Court on Feb. 20, 2026 before being partially rebuilt under other statutes.
“[paraphrase] Tariffs will bring auto manufacturing back to levels we haven't seen in 37 years.”
Auto and parts employment did not surge. Steel and aluminum tariffs raised input costs, factory construction spending fell about 30% from November 2024 to May 2026, and overall manufacturing payrolls were roughly 75,000 below the January 2025 level by mid-2026 — the opposite of a multi-decade high.
“[paraphrase] We will put a ring around the country — a tariff of 10 to 20 percent on all foreign goods sold in America.”
The universal tariff was imposed by emergency decree rather than by law and then collapsed. On Feb. 20, 2026 the Supreme Court struck it down 6-3; Trump signed an order halting collection and CBP stopped collecting on Feb. 24, 2026, with the Court of International Trade ordering administrative refunds on March 4, 2026. The White House announced a replacement 10% global tariff under other statutes, but as of September 2026 refunds remained tangled between Customs and the courts.
“[paraphrase] We'll put a 60 percent tariff — maybe more — on everything coming in from China.”
The across-the-board 60% China rate was never put in place. Rates swung wildly through 2025 truces and escalations, and PolitiFact still rated the promise Stalled at the one-year mark in January 2026. The Feb. 20, 2026 Supreme Court ruling invalidated the emergency authority Trump had used for most of the China tariffs.
“[paraphrase] An eye for an eye, a tariff for a tariff — whatever they charge us, we charge them.”
Congress never passed the Reciprocal Trade Act. Trump instead imposed 'reciprocal' rates by emergency decree on April 2, 2025, and the Supreme Court voided that authority on Feb. 20, 2026. PolitiFact rated the promise Stalled; as of September 2026 the reciprocal schedule exists only in improvised, litigated form under substitute statutes.
“[paraphrase] We will adopt a four-year plan to phase out all Chinese imports of essential goods — electronics, steel, pharmaceuticals.”
No phase-out plan was adopted. PolitiFact rated the promise Stalled through the January 2026 one-year review, and the Supreme Court's February 2026 tariff ruling removed the main legal tool the administration had been using against Chinese imports.
“[paraphrase] We will stop China from buying up American farmland and American infrastructure.”
No federal ban was enacted. USDA announced a farmland action plan in July 2025 but it depended on state laws and future rulemaking, and PolitiFact still rated the promise Stalled in its January 2026 one-year review.
“[paraphrase] Under the Phase One deal China will purchase an additional $200 billion of American goods and services over two years.”
Peterson Institute analysis by Chad Bown found China bought none of the additional $200 billion. Purchases of covered products in 2020 fell more than 40 percent short of the year's target, and over the full two-year period China reached only about 57 percent of commitments.
“[paraphrase] China is paying us billions of dollars in tariffs.”
Studies by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Princeton and Columbia economists found the cost of the tariffs was borne almost entirely by U.S. importers and consumers. The American Prospect cited an estimated consumer cost of roughly $34 billion a year and an estimated 300,000 jobs lost to the trade war.
“[paraphrase] Steel is coming back; our steelworkers are going back to work.”
Steel employment rose modestly in 2018 then fell back. U.S. Steel idled blast furnaces in Michigan and announced layoffs in 2019, and the industry shed jobs again in 2019 and 2020. The American Prospect cited continued losses in listing this among the broken promises.
“[paraphrase] I will direct the Treasury Secretary to label China a currency manipulator on day one.”
Treasury declined to make the designation through 2017, 2018 and most of 2019. It finally labeled China a currency manipulator on August 5, 2019, then reversed the designation on January 13, 2020, ahead of the Phase One signing. PolitiFact rated the promise a compromise.
“[paraphrase] Renegotiated trade deals and tariffs will bring the trade deficit down.”
The total U.S. trade deficit in goods and services rose 36.3 percent from 2016 to 2020, reaching nearly $654 billion in 2020, according to FactCheck.org.
“[paraphrase] China's entry into the WTO was a disaster and should be undone.”
China remained a WTO member throughout the term. The administration blocked appointments to the WTO Appellate Body, paralyzing it in December 2019, but took no action to remove China from the organization. PolitiFact rated the promise broken.